Add deployment setup and request rate limiting

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Keep the build context lean and secrets out of the image. Next.js would
+# happily read a baked-in .env at runtime — configuration must come from
+# --env-file / -e instead.
+.env*
+!.env.example
+env
+
+node_modules
+.next
+uploads
+test-results
+playwright-report
+coverage
+*.tsbuildinfo
+
+.git
+.gitignore
+.idea
+.claude
+.vscode
+.DS_Store
+
+Dockerfile
+.dockerignore
+docker-compose.yml
+docker
+deploy
+README.md

.gitignore

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 # misc
 .DS_Store
 *.pem
+.idea/
 
 # debug
 npm-debug.log*

Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Production image for the blog. Build and run:
+#
+#   docker build -t yap-blog .
+#   docker run -d --name yap-blog -p 3000:3000 --env-file .env \
+#     -v yap-blog-uploads:/app/uploads yap-blog
+#
+# Migrations and seeding are NOT part of the runtime image (they need dev
+# dependencies); run them from the `tools` stage against the same database:
+#
+#   docker build --target tools -t yap-blog-tools .
+#   docker run --rm --env-file .env yap-blog-tools npm run db:migrate
+#   docker run --rm --env-file .env yap-blog-tools npm run db:seed
+#
+# In .env, DATABASE_URL must be reachable FROM INSIDE the container —
+# `localhost` there means the container itself, not the host.
+
+# Node 24 to match development; its npm 11 is also what wrote
+# package-lock.json (npm 10's `npm ci` rejects npm 11 lockfile layouts).
+FROM node:24-alpine AS base
+WORKDIR /app
+ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
+
+FROM base AS deps
+COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci
+
+# Full source + dev dependencies: the build environment, also reused as the
+# `tools` stage for drizzle-kit migrations and the seed script.
+FROM deps AS tools
+COPY . .
+
+FROM tools AS builder
+# The build needs no database — every route renders dynamically at request
+# time — but importing src/db fail-fasts when DATABASE_URL is unset, so give
+# it a placeholder. The pool connects lazily; nothing dials this address.
+RUN NEXT_OUTPUT=standalone \
+  DATABASE_URL=postgresql://build:build@localhost:5432/placeholder \
+  npm run build
+
+FROM base AS runner
+ENV NODE_ENV=production HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0 PORT=3000
+RUN addgroup --system --gid 1001 nodejs \
+  && adduser --system --uid 1001 --ingroup nodejs nextjs
+# Pre-create the uploads dir writable so a fresh named volume inherits
+# ownership that the non-root server can write to.
+RUN mkdir uploads && chown nextjs:nodejs uploads
+COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone ./
+COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/static ./.next/static
+USER nextjs
+EXPOSE 3000
+VOLUME /app/uploads
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s \
+  CMD wget -qO /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:3000/ || exit 1
+CMD ["node", "server.js"]

README.md

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 # Yap Blog — a small self-hosted blogging platform
 
-A single-admin blogging platform built with **Next.js (App Router) + React + TypeScript**, backed by **PostgreSQL** via **Drizzle ORM**. Ships with fifteen switchable themes and twelve selectable body fonts, all configured from the admin area. Posts and static pages are written in Markdown, organized with tags, and managed through a session-authenticated admin area.
+A self-hosted blogging platform built with **Next.js (App Router) + React + TypeScript**, backed by **PostgreSQL** via **Drizzle ORM**. One admin plus optional author accounts with granular permissions, a WYSIWYG editor with Markdown paste and typing shortcuts, moderated threaded comments, an RSS feed + sitemap + SEO metadata, JSON backup import/export, fifteen switchable themes, and twelve selectable body fonts — all managed from a session-authenticated admin area.
 
 ![Stack](https://img.shields.io/badge/Next.js-16-blue) ![DB](https://img.shields.io/badge/PostgreSQL-17-blue) ![ORM](https://img.shields.io/badge/Drizzle-0.45-blue)
 
 ## Quick start
 
-Requirements: **Node.js ≥ 20**, **Docker** with the compose plugin, and free local ports **5434** (Postgres) and **3000** (dev server) — both configurable.
+Requirements: **Node.js ≥ 20** with **npm 11** (`package-lock.json` is written by npm 11, and npm 10's `npm ci` rejects its layout — Node 24 bundles the right npm), **Docker** with the compose plugin, and free local ports **5434** (Postgres) and **3000** (dev server) — both configurable.
 
 ```bash
 # 1. Configuration (set ADMIN_PASSWORD to taste)
@@ -59,11 +59,15 @@ The `blog_test` and `blog_e2e` databases are created automatically the first tim
 | `/posts/[slug]` | One published post |
 | `/tags/[slug]` | Published posts with that tag, paginated |
 | `/pages/[slug]` | One published static page |
+| `/feed.xml`, `/sitemap.xml`, `/robots.txt` | RSS feed and crawler metadata |
 | `/admin` | Dashboard (auth required) |
 | `/admin/login` | Sign in |
 | `/admin/posts`, `/admin/posts/new`, `/admin/posts/[id]/edit`, `/admin/posts/[id]/preview` | Post management |
 | `/admin/pages`, … | Static-page management (same shape as posts) |
-| `/admin/settings` | Site title, header/footer text, theme, font, navigation, home-page mode, pagination & excerpt limits |
+| `/admin/comments` | Comment moderation queue |
+| `/admin/users`, `/admin/users/new`, `/admin/users/[id]/edit` | Author accounts, per-tag posting rights, permissions (admin only) |
+| `/admin/account` | Change your own password |
+| `/admin/settings` | Site title & URL, header/footer text, theme, font, navigation, home-page mode, pagination & excerpt limits, import/export |
 
 ## Architecture
 
@@ -89,7 +93,7 @@ src/
 
 ### Key decisions
 
-- **Server components + server actions, no API layer.** Public pages are React Server Components that call the service layer directly; admin mutations are server actions. There are no JSON route handlers because nothing consumes them — one less surface to validate and keep in sync. Route handlers can be added later for an RSS feed or a public API without touching the services.
+- **Server components + server actions, almost no API layer.** Public pages are React Server Components that call the service layer directly; admin mutations are server actions. The only route handlers are the ones a browser actually consumes as URLs — the RSS feed, sitemap/robots, image upload + serving, and the backup export download — and they sit on the same service layer as everything else.
 - **A service layer owns all SQL.** Files under `src/lib/services/` are the only place queries live. Pages and actions stay thin, and the integration tests exercise the exact code paths production uses.
 - **Everything renders dynamically** (`force-dynamic` in the root layout). All content is admin-editable at runtime, so pages read the DB per request — plenty fast for an MVP and never stale. The obvious next optimization is tag-based caching (`revalidateTag`) around settings/posts.
 - **Auth: opaque session tokens, scrypt passwords.** Login verifies against a scrypt hash (Node's built-in crypto; parameters encoded per-hash so they can be raised later). Sessions are 32-byte random tokens in an `httpOnly` `SameSite=Lax` cookie; the database stores only the SHA-256 of the token, so a leaked DB dump cannot forge cookies. Expired sessions are treated as absent and purged on login. A failed login costs one scrypt derivation whether or not the username exists, avoiding a user-enumeration timing signal.
@@ -116,8 +120,8 @@ Public and admin groups have scoped `not-found.tsx`; `error.tsx` shows a generic
 
 ## Testing
 
-- **Unit** (`tests/unit/`): slugify + unique-slug suffixing, excerpt generation from stored HTML, both sanitizer pipelines (script stripping, event handlers, `javascript:` URLs, allowed editor marks), upload validation (MIME allowlist, size caps, filename generation), pagination parsing, URL validation.
+- **Unit** (`tests/unit/`): slugify + unique-slug suffixing, excerpt generation from stored HTML, both sanitizer pipelines (script stripping, event handlers, `javascript:` URLs, allowed editor marks), upload validation (MIME allowlist, size caps, filename generation), pagination parsing, URL validation, rate limiting (window rollover, per-key isolation, memory bound).
-- **Integration** (`tests/integration/`, real Postgres): draft exclusion from public queries, reverse-chronological ordering and pagination, publish/unpublish `publishedAt` semantics, duplicate-slug handling on create/update, tag visibility and filtering, home-page mode fallbacks after deletion/unpublication, nav resolution, password hashing, session lifecycle.
+- **Integration** (`tests/integration/`, real Postgres): draft exclusion from public queries, reverse-chronological ordering and pagination, publish/unpublish `publishedAt` semantics, duplicate-slug handling on create/update, tag visibility and filtering, home-page mode fallbacks after deletion/unpublication, nav resolution, password hashing, session lifecycle, comment threading/moderation, author permissions, import/export round-trips.
 - **E2E** (`tests/e2e/`, Playwright against a production build): admin routes redirect anonymously; bad credentials rejected; a full editorial flow — login → compose in the rich editor (heading + bold via toolbar) → publish → public listing/post/tag pages → draft 404s → logout locks the admin again; an editor-capabilities flow — markdown paste conversion, `<script>` stripped from pasted content, inline image upload through the toolbar, the uploaded file actually served, and the upload endpoint returning 401 anonymously; and an appearance flow (themes + fonts asserted via `data-*` attributes and computed styles).
 
 ```bash
@@ -125,13 +129,27 @@ npm test          # unit + integration (~7s)
 npm run test:e2e  # build + 3 E2E scenarios (~1 min)
 ```
 
+## Deploying
+
+The app is a standard Next.js server (`npm run build` + `npm start`) plus PostgreSQL — a small VPS runs both. Checklist for going live:
+
+1. **Postgres.** Point `DATABASE_URL` at a production database. The `blog`/`blog` credentials in `docker-compose.yml` are for local development — if you reuse the compose file on a server, change the password (and don't publish the port beyond localhost).
+2. **Seed.** Set a strong `ADMIN_PASSWORD` in `.env`, then `npm run db:migrate && npm run db:seed`. Passwords can be changed later from **Admin → Account**.
+3. **Run.** Two ready-made options:
+   - **systemd** — `deploy/yap-blog.service` runs `npm start` as a dedicated locked-down user; setup commands are in the unit file's header comment.
+   - **Docker** — the `Dockerfile` builds a self-contained standalone image (non-root, uploads on a named volume, healthcheck). Build/run/migrate commands are in its header comment; migrations run from the `tools` build stage, since the runtime image has no dev dependencies.
+4. **Reverse proxy + HTTPS.** Serve behind nginx/Caddy/Traefik with TLS — the session cookie is `Secure` in production, so plain HTTP logins will not stick. Make sure the proxy sets `X-Forwarded-For`; the login and comment rate limits key on it.
+5. **Site URL.** Set **Admin → Settings → Site URL** (or the `SITE_URL` env var) so canonical URLs, the RSS feed, and the sitemap carry your real domain instead of localhost.
+6. **Backups.** Back up Postgres and the `./uploads/` directory (inline images live there). The JSON export on the settings page covers content and settings, but not uploaded files.
+
 ## Out of scope (by design)
 
-Public registration, roles, comments, search, RSS, analytics, email, and deployment config are intentionally omitted.
+Public registration, search, analytics, and email are intentionally omitted.
 
 ## Known limitations
 
-- One administrator; credentials rotate via `.env` + re-seed.
+- Accounts are admin-created; there is no self-service password reset (the admin resets author passwords, and the admin password itself rotates via `.env` + re-seed).
+- Login and comment rate limits are in-memory and per-IP: they assume a single app instance and a reverse proxy that sets `X-Forwarded-For` (exposed directly, all traffic shares one bucket).
 - Every request hits the database (no caching layer yet — see the caching note above).
 - Images are unoptimized `<img>` tags by design (see Images); uploads live on local disk, so a multi-instance deployment needs the object-storage swap described above.
 - Upload validation trusts the declared MIME type (plus a strict extension map and SVG exclusion); magic-byte sniffing would be the next hardening step.

deploy/yap-blog.service

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# systemd unit for running the blog directly on a server (no Docker).
+#
+# Setup, assuming the checkout lives at /opt/yap-blog:
+#
+#   sudo useradd --system --home-dir /opt/yap-blog --shell /usr/sbin/nologin yap-blog
+#   cd /opt/yap-blog
+#   npm ci && npm run build          # .env must hold the production DATABASE_URL
+#   npm run db:migrate && npm run db:seed
+#   sudo chown -R yap-blog:yap-blog /opt/yap-blog
+#   sudo cp deploy/yap-blog.service /etc/systemd/system/
+#   sudo systemctl daemon-reload
+#   sudo systemctl enable --now yap-blog
+#
+# After deploying new code: npm ci && npm run build && npm run db:migrate,
+# then `sudo systemctl restart yap-blog`. Adjust the npm path in ExecStart
+# if `which npm` says something else (e.g. a nodesource or nvm install).
+
+[Unit]
+Description=Yap Blog (Next.js)
+Wants=network-online.target
+After=network-online.target postgresql.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=yap-blog
+Group=yap-blog
+WorkingDirectory=/opt/yap-blog
+# `next start` runs in production mode and reads .env from the working
+# directory. To keep secrets outside the checkout instead, delete .env and
+# uncomment:
+# EnvironmentFile=/etc/yap-blog/env
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/npm start
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=3
+
+# The filesystem is read-only to the service except where it writes:
+# uploaded images, and .next (Next.js keeps runtime caches/traces there).
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+PrivateTmp=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ProtectHome=read-only
+ReadWritePaths=/opt/yap-blog/uploads /opt/yap-blog/.next
+ProtectKernelTunables=true
+ProtectKernelModules=true
+ProtectControlGroups=true
+RestrictSUIDSGID=true
+RestrictRealtime=true
+LockPersonality=true
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target

next.config.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ const nextConfig: NextConfig = {
   // Pin the workspace root so stray lockfiles in parent directories
   // don't confuse Turbopack's project detection.
   turbopack: { root: __dirname },
+  // The Docker image runs the self-contained .next/standalone server.
+  // Gated behind an env var because `next start` (systemd/local) refuses
+  // to run a build produced with output: "standalone".
+  ...(process.env.NEXT_OUTPUT === "standalone" ? { output: "standalone" as const } : {}),
   experimental: {
     // Site-import uploads carry a whole backup in one action request;
     // the default 1 MB cap is far too small. Imports themselves are

src/actions/auth.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 "use server";
 
 import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
+import { headers } from "next/headers";
 import { redirect } from "next/navigation";
 import { db } from "@/db";
 import { users } from "@/db/schema";
@@ -13,10 +14,16 @@ import { hashPassword, verifyPassword } from "@/lib/auth/password";
 import { createSession, deleteExpiredSessions, deleteSession } from "@/lib/auth/session";
 import type { FormState } from "@/lib/forms";
 import { zodErrorToFormState } from "@/lib/forms";
+import { clientKeyFrom, createRateLimiter } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
 import { loginFormSchema } from "@/lib/validation";
 
 const GENERIC_LOGIN_ERROR = "Invalid username or password.";
 
+// Slows credential stuffing and caps how much scrypt work an attacker can
+// demand. Successful logins reset the counter, so legitimate re-logins
+// (and repeated dev/E2E runs) never trip it.
+const loginLimiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 10, windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000 });
+
 // Verified against when the username doesn't exist, so both failure paths
 // cost one scrypt derivation (no username-probing timing signal).
 let dummyHashPromise: Promise<string> | null = null;
@@ -32,6 +39,11 @@ export async function loginAction(_prev: FormState, formData: FormData): Promise
   });
   if (!parsed.success) return zodErrorToFormState(parsed.error);
 
+  const clientKey = clientKeyFrom(await headers());
+  if (!loginLimiter.allow(clientKey)) {
+    return { formError: "Too many sign-in attempts. Please wait a few minutes and try again." };
+  }
+
   let ok = false;
   try {
     const [user] = await db
@@ -45,6 +57,7 @@ export async function loginAction(_prev: FormState, formData: FormData): Promise
     ok = passwordOk && user !== undefined;
 
     if (ok && user) {
+      loginLimiter.reset(clientKey);
       await deleteExpiredSessions();
       const { token, expiresAt } = await createSession(user.id);
       await setSessionCookie(token, expiresAt);

src/actions/comments.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 "use server";
 
 import { revalidatePath } from "next/cache";
+import { headers } from "next/headers";
 import { z } from "zod";
 import { requireAdmin, requireUser } from "@/lib/auth/dal";
 import type { FormState } from "@/lib/forms";
 import { zodErrorToFormState } from "@/lib/forms";
+import { clientKeyFrom, createRateLimiter } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
 import {
   createComment,
   deleteComment,
@@ -13,6 +15,10 @@ import {
 } from "@/lib/services/comments";
 import { commentFormSchema } from "@/lib/validation";
 
+// The honeypot below catches naive bots; this caps what the ones that skip
+// it can insert. Generous enough for an enthusiastic human in a thread.
+const commentLimiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 5, windowMs: 10 * 60 * 1000 });
+
 /**
  * The one unauthenticated mutation in the app. Safe because the result is
  * always a pending comment — nothing shows publicly until an admin approves
@@ -30,6 +36,12 @@ export async function submitCommentAction(
     return { status: "success" };
   }
 
+  if (!commentLimiter.allow(clientKeyFrom(await headers()))) {
+    return {
+      formError: "You are commenting too quickly. Please wait a few minutes and try again.",
+    };
+  }
+
   const parsed = commentFormSchema.safeParse({
     postId: formData.get("postId"),
     parentId: formData.get("parentId"),

src/lib/rate-limit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/**
+ * Fixed-window, in-memory rate limiting for the handful of endpoints that
+ * accept anonymous or pre-auth traffic (login, public comment submission).
+ * In-memory is sound here because the app is single-instance by design
+ * (uploads already live on local disk); a multi-instance deployment would
+ * move this to Redis the same way it moves uploads to object storage.
+ *
+ * Deliberately free of next/* imports so it can be exercised directly by
+ * unit tests; reading request headers happens in the calling action.
+ */
+
+type WindowEntry = { count: number; windowStart: number };
+
+export type RateLimiter = {
+  /** Records an attempt and returns false when the key is over the limit. */
+  allow(key: string, now?: number): boolean;
+  /** Forgets a key, e.g. after a successful login. */
+  reset(key: string): void;
+};
+
+export function createRateLimiter(options: {
+  /** Attempts allowed per window. */
+  limit: number;
+  windowMs: number;
+  /**
+   * Memory bound: expired entries are swept once the map holds this many
+   * keys. Spoofed X-Forwarded-For values can mint unlimited keys, so the
+   * bound matters; 10k entries is ~1 MB and a sweep clears a whole window.
+   */
+  maxKeys?: number;
+}): RateLimiter {
+  const { limit, windowMs, maxKeys = 10_000 } = options;
+  const entries = new Map<string, WindowEntry>();
+
+  function sweepExpired(now: number): void {
+    for (const [key, entry] of entries) {
+      if (now - entry.windowStart >= windowMs) entries.delete(key);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    allow(key: string, now: number = Date.now()): boolean {
+      const entry = entries.get(key);
+      if (!entry || now - entry.windowStart >= windowMs) {
+        if (!entry && entries.size >= maxKeys) sweepExpired(now);
+        entries.set(key, { count: 1, windowStart: now });
+        return true;
+      }
+      entry.count += 1;
+      return entry.count <= limit;
+    },
+    reset(key: string): void {
+      entries.delete(key);
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Best-effort client key from request headers. Behind the reverse proxy a
+ * production deployment should run anyway (see README → Deploying),
+ * X-Forwarded-For's first hop is the real client. Exposed directly, the
+ * header is absent and all traffic shares the "unknown" bucket — coarse,
+ * but the protected actions stay usable and the limiter still bounds cost.
+ */
+export function clientKeyFrom(headers: Headers): string {
+  const forwarded = headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
+  const first = forwarded?.split(",")[0]?.trim();
+  if (first) return first.slice(0, 100);
+  const realIp = headers.get("x-real-ip")?.trim();
+  if (realIp) return realIp.slice(0, 100);
+  return "unknown";
+}

tests/unit/rate-limit.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { clientKeyFrom, createRateLimiter } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
+
+describe("createRateLimiter", () => {
+  it("allows up to the limit within a window, then refuses", () => {
+    const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 3, windowMs: 1000 });
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 0)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 1)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 2)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 3)).toBe(false);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 999)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("starts a fresh window once the previous one expires", () => {
+    const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 1000 });
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 0)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 500)).toBe(false);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 1000)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("tracks keys independently", () => {
+    const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 1000 });
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 0)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 1)).toBe(false);
+    expect(limiter.allow("b", 1)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("reset forgets a key's attempts", () => {
+    const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 1000 });
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 0)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 1)).toBe(false);
+    limiter.reset("a");
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 2)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("sweeps expired entries instead of growing past maxKeys", () => {
+    const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 1000, maxKeys: 3 });
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 0)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("b", 0)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("c", 0)).toBe(true);
+    // All three are expired at t=1000; the sweep makes room, and the new
+    // key is not throttled by leftover state.
+    expect(limiter.allow("d", 1000)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("d", 1001)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps live windows intact across a sweep", () => {
+    const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 1000, maxKeys: 2 });
+    expect(limiter.allow("a", 0)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("b", 500)).toBe(true);
+    expect(limiter.allow("c", 600)).toBe(true); // sweep drops nothing live
+    expect(limiter.allow("b", 700)).toBe(false); // b's window survived
+  });
+});
+
+describe("clientKeyFrom", () => {
+  it("uses the first hop of x-forwarded-for", () => {
+    const headers = new Headers({ "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.7, 10.0.0.1" });
+    expect(clientKeyFrom(headers)).toBe("203.0.113.7");
+  });
+
+  it("falls back to x-real-ip, then to a shared bucket", () => {
+    expect(clientKeyFrom(new Headers({ "x-real-ip": "203.0.113.9" }))).toBe("203.0.113.9");
+    expect(clientKeyFrom(new Headers())).toBe("unknown");
+  });
+
+  it("caps the key length so junk headers cannot bloat the store", () => {
+    const headers = new Headers({ "x-forwarded-for": "x".repeat(500) });
+    expect(clientKeyFrom(headers)).toHaveLength(100);
+  });
+});